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Casenote

Politics As Usual: The Continuing Debate
Over Partisan Gerrymandering Schemes in
League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Perry

In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,' the Supreme
Court held that a statewide challenge to the Texas State Legislature's
mid-term redistricting plan did not violate Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,2 but that the redrawing of district lines in one
particular district (District 23) did violate the Act. The case leaves
open the ability of the Supreme Court to adjudicate political gerrymandering schemes in cases where equal protection claims are made.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2003 the Republican Party gained control of the Texas state house,
senate, and governorship.4 The Republicans "'set out to increase their
representation in the congressional delegation,'" and to accomplish this

1.
2.
3.
4.

126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2626.
Id. at 2606.
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goal, they promulgated a plan known as Plan 1374C'. As a result of
Plan 1374C, the 2004 Texas Congressional elections brought the
Republicans twenty-one of the state's thirty-two congressional seats
while also garnering them fifty-eight percent of the popular vote in
statewide elections.6
Plan 1374C made changes to districts in south and west Texas, the
most significant of which involved District 23 and the newly created
District 25. Changes in these districts were challenged as violations
of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment8 insofar as it affected the Latino
vote.9 After the 2002 election, it became apparent that an increasing
Latino population in District 23 was going to oust Henry Bonilla, the
incumbent Republican candidate from that district. Through Plan
1374C, the legislature divided up the largely Hispanic district, adding
voters from largely white, Republican areas. To avoid retrogression, the
legislature also created District 25, forming a majority Latino voting
district to replace the divided District 23.10
Soon after Plan 1374C was enacted, the League of United Latin
American Citizens ("The League") challenged the plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander that violated Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 by splitting up largely Hispanic areas for purely
partisan gain." The district court "entered judgment against [the
plaintiffs] on their claims," and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme
Court.12 Before the Court heard the case, however, the Court issued its
opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer,3 in which a plurality of the Court held
that political gerrymandering schemes presented a nonjusticiable
issue. 14 The Court then remanded Perry back to the district court for
reconsideration in light of Vieth. 5
On remand, the district court, interpreting its mandate to include only
claims of political gerrymandering, again rejected
the appellant's
17
claims. 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2613.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
126 S. Ct. at 2612.
Id.
See id. at 2607.
Id.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 305.
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The 1990 census resulted in Texas gaining three additional seats in
its congressional delegation, bringing its total delegation to thirty
seats."8 When new district lines were drawn in 1991, the Democratic
party had control of "both houses in the state legislature, the governorship, and [nineteen] of [Texas's twenty-seven] seats in Congress."19 The
Democrats in the state legislature, fearful that the Republicans would
soon constitute the majority of voters in the state, designed a congressional redistricting plan that would favor Democratic candidates. ° The
Democrats used computer technology to draw what has been referred to
as the "shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990S. " 21 The 1991 plan packed

"'heavily Republican' suburban areas" into just a small number of
districts, while keeping Democratic areas just strong enough to ensure
continued election of Democratic candidates.22
Voters who sought to invalidate the plan criticized the 1991 redistricting scheme, claiming that the plan was nothing more than a simple
partisan gerrymander, but each of the claims brought by the voters were
rejected by the courts. 23 As a result of the 1991 gerrymandering
scheme, the Republican Party, despite garnering fifty-nine percent of the
vote in the 2000 statewide24elections, won only thirteen of the state's
thirty congressional seats.

When it came time to incorporate two

additional congressional seats as a result of the 2000 Census, the
Republican Party controlled the governorship and the state senate, but
not the state house of representatives. 25 Due to this division in the
legislature, the Texas Legislature was unable to agree on a new
redistricting plan that would incorporate the two new seats. 21 The
courts were brought in to provide a plan, and the litigation resulted in
a plan known as Plan 1151C.2 7 The court in Balderas,which drew the
plan, sought to apply "only 'neutral' redistricting standards" in drawing

17. Id. at 2604-05.
18. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2006).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting M. BARONE, R. COHEN & C. COOK, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
2002 1448 (2001)).
22. Id. (quoting Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 768 n.47 (2005)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2606.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (see Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 35673968 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
2001) (per curium, affd, 536 U.S. 919 (2002)).
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its plan, meaning that no party was to be favored over another, and the
court explained that it did not wish to "'und[o] the work of one political
party for the benefit of another,'" realizing that the primary authority
28
for the drawing of district lines rested with the legislative branch.
Plan 1151C resulted in the Democrats retaining a slim majority in the
Texas delegation, despite the fact that in the previous election Republicans had gained almost sixty percent of the popular vote. 9 Plan
1374C, which scrapped the Balderas plan, is the subject of this case.
A.

Introduction: The Voting Rights Act of 1965
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act now states that:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees [set forth in this Act]." °
A State violates Section Two of the Voting Rights Act if:
[Biased on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members
of [a racial or ethnic group] in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.31

Article I, section 4, of the United States Constitution delegates the duty
of reapportionment of districts to the state legislatures. 2
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed "primarily to enforce the
[Fifteenth] [Almendment to the Constitution of the United States and
...to enforce the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment and [Airticle I, [Slection
4.33 Barriers to voting such as literacy tests and poll taxes had for
years been used in a number of states to deny the right to vote to many
people because of their race.34 The Act was amended in 1982"5 dispos-

28. Id. (quoting Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 768) (alteration in original).
29. Id. (citing Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64).
30.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).

31. 42 U.S.C. 1973(b) (2000).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2607-08 (citing Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 34 (1993)).
33. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Voting Rights Act of 1965, H. Rep. No. 439 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. Vol. 112437, and in 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL RIFHTS PART H1,at 1484 (Bernard Schwartz, ed.) (1970).
34. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-439).
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itively rejecting the position of the Court in Mobile v. Bolden,36 which
stated, in a plurality opinion, that proof that a contested electoral
practice or mechanism was adopted with the intent to discriminate was
necessary in order to establish a Section Two violation. 37 The Senate
Report that accompanied the 1982 amendments emphasized that the
proper inquiry, when examining voter discrimination, was whether the
contested electoral practice resulted in a situation that denied a
particular group "equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice."3 s After the 1982
amendments, the Act required only a showing that a particular electoral
practice or mechanism had a discriminatory effect or result on a
particular group in order to establish a Section Two violation.39
B. Development of PoliticalGerrymanderingJurisprudenceUnder
Section Two Following the 1982 Amendments
The Supreme Court construed Section Two of the Voting Rights Act,
as amended June 29, 1982 (the Act's current form), for the first time in
Thornburg v. Gingles,4 ° a case in which black voters challenged several
North Carolina voting districts, claiming that the districts impaired
black voters' "ability to elect representatives of their choice."4 1 In
Gingles the Court identified three factors that must be present in order
for a minority group to bring a cognizable claim of vote dilution of a
minority bloc. 4 2 Initially, "the minority group must be able demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
If this were not
constitute a majority in a single-member district."'
true, as would be the case in a "substantially integrated" district, then
the makeup of the district cannot be necessarily shown to be the cause
of the inability of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates."
Second, the minority group must be shown to be "politically cohesive,"
meaning that the majority of minority members in the district tend to
vote for candidates of a particular political affiliation.48 Third, "the
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Id. at 64-65.
S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 n.8.
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
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sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed-usually to defeat
the minority's preferred candidate."46
Eight years later, in Johnson v. De Grandy,47 the Court rejected a socalled "safe harbor" rule that would have precluded challenges to state
gerrymandering schemes where the percentage of single-member
districts in which minority voters formed an effective voting bloc
mirrored the minority voters' percentage of the relevant population.4
In addition, the Court concluded that "the rights of some minority voters
...
may [not] be traded off against the rights of other members of the
same minority class," meaning that Section Two violations in one district
could not be remedied by the creation of another majority-minority
Finally, the Court held that proportionality is not an
district.49
affirmative defense to a Section Two challenge because "[nlo single
statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether a set of
single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength." °
In 1996 the Court in Bush v. Vera,5 held that Section Two did not
forbid the creation of a noncompact majority-minority district,5
meaning that the majority-minority district does not have to be tailored
around a centralized location or follow a certain shape. However, such
a noncompact district could not be created to remedy a Section Two
violation elsewhere in the state.' Therefore, minority districts do not
have to sit in a centralized location, so long as a minority district was
not created in response to the destruction of another compact opportunity minority district in violation of Section Two.
The development of the statute's jurisprudence took another turn in
Vieth v. Jubelirer4when the Court, in a plurality opinion, stated that
because no "discernible and manageable standards" existed for the
adjudication of political gerrymandering schemes, such schemes must
necessarily be nonjusticiable issues.55 Previously, the Court had stated
that such a standard may exist, but the Court could not define it at that
time.56 In Vieth the Court opined that the loose "standard" employed

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. (citations omitted).
512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Id. at 1017-19.
Id. at 1019-20.

50. Id. at 1020-21.
51. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
52. Id. at 979.
53. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2617 (citing Vera, 517 U.S. at 1008).
54. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
55. Id. at 281.
56. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
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by the Court in Davis v. Bandemer,6 7 which involved a determination
of (1) discriminatory intent and (2) discriminatory effect, was simply an
unworkable method for evaluating political gerrymandering schemes for
two reasons.5 8 First, it is difficult to determine whether the effect of a
political gerrymandering scheme was intended by the legislature at the
time the scheme was enacted; second, it is even more difficult, if not
impossible, to find that a group has been effectively denied its opportunity to participate in the political process because a group could effectively
participate even without electing a single candidate.5 9
III.

CouRT's RATIONALE

Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Perry, quickly determined
that the last two prongs of the Gingles analysis were present in the
redistricting of District 23.60
The second Gingles requirement of
cohesion among the minority group was demonstrated by the fact that
ninety-two percent of Latinos voted against the Republican incumbent
Bonilla in 2002, whereas eighty-eight percent of non-Latinos voted for
him.6 ' The third Gingles factor of majority bloc voting was demonstrated by the previous finding by the district court and by the finding of
"'racially polarized voting'" not just in south and west Texas, but
"'throughout the [SItate [of Texas]."' 62
In finding that Latino voters in the old (pre-Plan 1374C) District 23
were "'sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority'" in the district (the first Gingles factor), the Court determined
that the Latino population constituted a majority of the voting-age
population in the district and possessed an electoral opportunity that
was protected by Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 63 The
direction that the district was moving-toward an increasing Latino
population-indicated that while the district may not yet have constituted a district in which Latinos could consistently elect a candidate of
their choice, breaking up the district would deprive Latinos of an
"opportunity district" that they would have had in the near future.64

57. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281-84 (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127).
59. Id. at 281-82.
60. 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2006).
61.

Id. (citing Allan Lichtman, VoTING-RIGHTs ISSUES IN TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL

REDISTRICING51(2003) http://www.votingrightsact.org/appendix/midatlantizregional/pdfs
/hirschexhibit5.pdf).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50).

64. Id.
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The Court pointed to the "increase in Latino voter registration and
overall population," "the near-victory of the Latino candidate of choice
in 2002," "the ... threat to ... Bonilla['s] incumbency," and the
"concomitant rise in Latino voting power in each successive election"
as
reasons that the redistricting was a "denial of opportunity" to the Latino
population in the new (post-Plan 1374C) District 23.65 The new
District 23 was found not to be a Latino opportunity district because
although Latinos made up the majority of the population in the district,
not all of that population was eligible to vote.66 Among eligible voters
in the new District 23, Latinos no longer made up the majority of the
eligible voters and were thus denied an opportunity district by the
gerrymandering scheme."
In dismissing the State's argument that the creation of the new
opportunity district for Latinos (District 25) offset the loss of the
opportunity district in District 23, the Court determined that the
creation of a non-compact majority-minority district cannot remedy a
Section Two violation elsewhere in the state. 68 Although no specific
rule was established as to whether a district qualified as compact, the
Court held that "'traditional districting principles such as maintaining
communities of interest and traditional boundaries'" should govern the
determination.69 The simple fact that two isolated segments of a racial
group have been combined to form a single district does not mean that
an opportunity district has been created because, as the Court stated,
there is no reason to believe that those voters will share the same
candidates, concerns, and interests. ° Combining two disparate groups
into a single district could have the opposite effect of preventing both
groups from achieving their political goals. 7'
After concluding that all three of the Gingles requirements were met
in regards to District 23, the Court then proceeded to examine the
"totality of the circumstances" to determine if Section Two was
violated."
In Johnson v. De Grandy,3 the Court held that where
"minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of districts
roughly proportional to the minority voters' respective shares in the...

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2615-16.
Id. at 2616.
Id. at 2615-16.
Id. at 2616-17 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916 (1996)).
Id. at 2618 (quoting Bush, 517 U.S. at 977).
Id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).

71. Id.
72. Id. at 2619-20.
73. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
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population," no Section Two violation can be found to exist.74 The
Court held that while "proportionality is not dispositive" in striking
down a Section Two challenge, "it is a relevant factor in the totality of
[the] circumstances."75
Examining proportionality in Perry, the Court agreed with the
plaintiffs that proportionality as a factor should be examined on a
statewide, rather than a regional, basis.76 The Court reached this
conclusion based upon the principle that "the right to an undiluted vote
"77
does not belong to [a minority group] but to 'its individual members'
and because the claim focused on an alleged injury to Hispanic voters
throughout the state, not just a portion of the state. 7' The vote dilution
that occurred in District 23 as a result of Plan 1374C would have
implications on Hispanic voters throughout the state. 79 The district
court found that Latinos made up twenty-two percent of the voting-age
population, yet the Latino compact opportunity districts amounted to
roughly sixteen percent of the total voting districts, approximately a twodistrict deficit for Latinos. 0 The Court did not examine whether this
deficit was insubstantial because it found other evidence of vote dilution
for Latinos in District 23, including increased political activity among
Latinos in the District, increased voter registration among the population, and the fact that Latino voters were on the verge of ousting the
incumbent Bonilla from office in District 23.1
The Court noted that the protection of incumbents is a legitimate
factor in redistricting decisions, but the legislature may not do so simply
because the voters appear poised to vote the incumbent out of office. 2
Redistricting that has the effect of not allowing a cohesive minority
group to vote an incumbent out of office when it is poised to do so cannot
stand when it has the effect of diluting the votes of that minority
group.83 The Court frowned upon what it called a "troubling blend of
politics and race" and determined that the dissection of the old District
23 constituted a Section Two violation and the creation of the new

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1000.
Id.
Perry, i26 S. Ct. at 2620.
Id. (quoting Shaw, 517 U.S. at 917).

78. Id. at 2620-21.
79. Id. at 2621.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 2622-23.
83. Id. at 2623.
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District 25 as a Latino opportunity district did not compensate for the
84
loss of the opportunity district in District 23.
The Court, although finding that the new District 23 violated Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act, did not invalidate the entire Texas
redistricting plan. 5 Only District 23 was ordered redrawn because,
based on the three Gingles factors and the totality of the circumstances,
the redistricting diluted the rights of Latino voters to elect their
candidate of choice.86
Justice Kennedy, in dicta, noted that there is nothing inherently
suspect about mid-district redistricting plans, while reaffirming the
belief that legislatively made plans are preferable to court-made
plans.8 7 He also noted that the plaintiffs had provided "no legally
impermissible use of political classifications," thus dooming their
claims." Finally, Justice Kennedy concluded that changes to District
24-a primarily African-American district-did not constitute a Section
Two violation because such a violation cannot be established merely by
the ability of a minority group to influence the outcome of an election;
instead, Section Two requires that the minority group show an ability
to elect their candidate of choice "'with the assistance of cross-over
votes.'"8 9
A.

Justice Stevens, Concurringin Partand Dissenting in Part
In his opinion, Justice Stevens, after recounting the sordid history of
redistricting in Texas," argued that the purely political redistricting
scheme, which invalidated the court-drawn scheme, was unconstitutional
and should be invalidated.9'
In formulating his opinion, Justice
Stevens announced a test for evaluating the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymanders.92 First, in order to have standing to challenge a
redistricting plan, a plaintiff would have to be either a "candidate or a
voter" in a changed district.93 Second, a plaintiff would have to prove

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 2626.
See id.
Id. at 2608.
Id. at 2612.
Id. at 2624-26 (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993)).

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 2627-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 2646-47.
Id. at 2642.
Id.
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an "improper purpose" for the gerrymander.9 4 Third, the plaintiff
would have to prove an improper effect of the plan.95
In order to prove improper purpose, the plaintiff would have to prove
that the legislature subordinated neutral redistricting standards to their
political motives and that the biggest motivating factor for the redistricting was increasing one party's political power."
To satisfy the improper effect prong of the test, the plaintiff would be
required to prove three facts: "(1) her candidate of choice won election
under the old plan; (2) her residence is now in a district that is a safe
seat for the opposite party; and (3) her new district is less compact than
the old district."97 Satisfying the standing, improper purpose, and
improper effect prongs of the test would, for Justice Stevens, prove that
a redistricting plan violates a person's constitutional rights. 9
B.

Justice Souter, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Justice Souter acknowledged that the Court had established no single
criterion that would render a gerrymander unconstitutional." Justice
Souter reasoned that the plurality of the Court was incorrect in holding
that the dissolution of District 24 (a primarily black district) did not
violate Section Two because it did not meet the first Gingles requirement."°
Interpreting the first Gingles requirement-that is, that a
minority group must be "'sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district'"l0 l-Justice Souter
would have held that the requirement would be satisfied if minority
voters in a redrawn district would "constitute a majority of those voting
in the primary of the dominant party."1 2 Under his rule, he would
remand the case back to the district court with instructions not to be
tethered to the rule that a minority group must constitute fifty percent
of the population in order to claim a violation under Section Two.0 3

94. Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 2642-43.
Id. at 2643.
Id.

99. Id. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

100. Id. at 2650.
101. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 60.
102. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2648 (Souter, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2651 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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C. Justice Breyer, Concurringin Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Breyer argued that the plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution because the only justification for the
redistricting was based on partisan grounds, which could have "harmful
electoral consequences. " "
D. Chief Justice Roberts, Concurring in Part, Concurringin the
Judgment in Part,and Dissenting in Part
Chief Justice Roberts urged that the holding of the majority-that
District 25 was not sufficiently "compact" to compensate for the breaking
apart of District 23-was erroneous because there was no showing that
Latino-preferred candidates would be more disadvantaged under the new
plan (1374C) than under the old one and because the actual distance
between points in the old District 23 was beyond the farthest points in
the new District 25.05 Chief Justice Roberts further emphasized that
District 25 was not created by making "assumptions" about how the
Latino members of that district would vote at the polls, but rather by
analyzing statistical evidence, a finding supported by the district
court.1 °6 Further, he concluded that the majority erred by not holding
that District 25 was an effective opportunity district for Latinos because
the six Latino opportunity districts out of thirty-two constitute nineteen
percent of the seats, which is "roughly proportional" to their percentage
in the population. 10 7 The fact that the Latino population in the district
are from different areas, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, does not mean
that the Latino population does not have an opportunity voting
district. 0 8
E. Justice Scalia, Concurring in the Judgment and Dissenting in
Part
Justice Scalia believed that the issue of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering should not be before the Court.0 9 Justice Scalia
pointed out that the district court's finding that intent to discriminate
based on race was not a factor in the redistricting plan precludes the

104. Id. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2653, 2657 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
106. Id. at 2656-57, 2661.

107. Id. at 2662.
108. Id. at 2662-63.
109. Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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plaintiff's claims of vote dilution in this case." ° Justice Scalia further
asserted that the use of race as the dominant factor in the creation of
District 25 (as a majority-minority district) triggers strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause."' Justice Scalia noted that he would
normally remand the case to the district court to conduct a "'factintensive' inquiry" as to whether the creation of District 25 was done in
order to comply with Section Five of the Voting Rights Act; but in this
case the appellants had already conceded that it was, and he therefore
would allow District 25 to remain as it was." 2
IV.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

A plurality of the Court in Perry seems to have backtracked from its
plurality decision in Vieth, which held that political gerrymandering
schemes were nonjusticiable issues."' Now, it appears that partisan
gerrymandering schemes may fall under the purview of the courts when
equal protection questions are raised under Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act. Therefore, it seems that while racial minority groups are
obviously still a protected class for purposes of equal protection, minority
political groups are not. The three Gingles requirements still appear to
be presumptively valid, but the validity of the first requirement-that
the racial group is sufficiently large to constitute a majority in the
district-has been brought into question, particularly by Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Perry."4
Political parties may still redistrict their respective states for purely
political reasons, but must do so with the awareness that they may not
unfairly infringe upon the ability of minority groups to have the
opportunity to select their candidate of choice. The ruling from Perry
does not mean that states may not place their own individual restrictions on mid-decade redistricting plans. In Lance v. Dennis,"' decided
two months after Perry,the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado held that state constitutions may place more stringent
restrictions on redistricting than the federal Constitution and prohibit
mid-decade redistricting altogether."'
The Court has not yet articulated a clear standard for when partisan
gerrymandering schemes may be challenged under Section Two. The

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 2664.
Id. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2668-69 (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 484, 490 (2003)).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004).
126 S. Ct. 2594, 2648 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
444 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2006).
Id. at 1157 n.12.
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"totality of the circumstances" language leaves a great deal of room for
interpretation, notwithstanding the three Gingles requirements.
Gerrymandering schemes will no doubt continue to be challenged in the
courts, but the general opinion of the Court appears to give deference to
the legislature in drawing such schemes, except in cases where it can be
shown that a district has diluted a minority group's ability to overcome
prior electoral discrimination. Minority opportunity districts, once
established, may not be dismantled by a partisan legislature, particular7
ly when that group has a history of discrimination in that state."
The definitional question of what constitutes a "compact" district for
purposes of the Gingles requirements awaits future litigation because
the Court has laid out no clear standard in this area. There will
continue to be a large number of these types of cases brought before the
district courts because of the enormous political consequences that can
result from a partisan scheme. An effective gerrymander can continue
to allow a party that is declining in popularity in a state to maintain
control of a majority of the seats for many years.
STEVE FLYNN

117.

See Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2626 (2006).

